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EDITOR’S NOTE: This speech was delivered by the
author at the International Bar Association’s 10th
Transnational Crime Conference on June 9, 2007.
Last Saturday, I joined the International BarAssociation. Why that day? Because I wasplanning my remarks for this conference and
realized with a clarity that was somewhat surpris-
ing that it is no longer enough to be a member of
one’s local bar, or the
American Bar
Association, or the
American Law Institute,
or all of these.
Law, at least the law
about which I care, is
global. And lawyers
throughout the world
need to meet. Lawyers
from varying legal sys-
tems need to examine
both established and
emerging legal issues. Lawyers must be as aware
of new legal theories, procedures, and strategies
as they are of technological innovations that
enable them to improve the legal services that
they provide. In short, you are doing exactly what
needs to be done. I am proud to now be part of
your efforts.
The world faces new and challenging issues. It
seems that every scientific and technical advance
that makes the world more efficient and productive
has a downside. For example, the computers we
use to do our writing, run our spreadsheets, receive
and send our e-mails are essential to our day-to-day
work. Yet, the very equipment that serves us well is
a target for those who would do us harm. They
may simply be spammers. Or they may be common
criminals seeking to defraud us using old methods
applied to new technology. Or they may be elec-
tronic terrorists desiring to destroy the very devices
upon which we rely.
I became acutely aware of the irony that innova-
tion almost always has minuses as well as pluses
when I served on the National Institute of Justice’s
Less than Lethal
Liability Panel. This
was a group of lawyers,
assisted often by doc-
tors and scientists, that
was tasked with advis-
ing NIJ on the possible
liabilities that might
be associated with
adopting new techno-
logies (often with
military roots) for
law enforcement.
We looked at a wide range of issues. One was
whether pepper spray, now frequently carried by
police officers, could cause asphyxiation on the
part of sprayed individuals when they were
restrained. Another was whether sticky foam could
be used to quell riots without running (a) the risk
that officers using the foam would be caught in it
and (b) a risk of environmental harm. A third was
whether rubber bullets were a safe and effective
form of riot control. In each instance, the notion
behind an innovation was that it avoided the use of
lethal force—typically, the use of a firearm by a
police officer. The question put to our panel was
whether the probability that the innovation would
save lives was outweighed by the risks that greater
harm and hence liabilities would result from adopt-
ing the innovation.
The issues we addressed were not only relevant
to law enforcement in the United States. They were
issues that could and did arise in many jurisdic-
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tions around the world. Indeed, the nonlethal techniques
we considered were often borrowed from the experience
of another country. In many instances, our advice was that
proposed innovations were unwise, illegal, or unconstitu-
tional. While we never questioned the good intentions of
proponents of new ideas, we never blinked the duty to
speak the truth.
Our panel was defunded and no longer exists, but my
experience with it is a reminder of the important role that
lawyers serve in protecting and advancing the rule of law,
and in seeing to it that governments receive wise counsel
as they seek to advance the rule of law through innova-
tion. As the world becomes more complex and therefore
more dangerous, governments seek to limit individual
rights in the name of crime control and/or national securi-
ty. They sometimes claim the need to innovate, with liber-
ty the cost of innovation. We must always keep in mind
that individual rights once lost are not easily regained. The
unique and important role of an independent bar in pro-
tecting and defending liberty is more, not less, important
than ever before.
Attack on lawyers
It is from this perspective that I wish to express my con-
cern as to recent attacks on the legal profession that have
occurred here in the United States and elsewhere in the
world. Attacks on the private bar often are accompanied
by attacks on the independence of the judiciary, and these
attacks are a frontal assault on the very notion of the rule
of law.
Let us recall that attacks on lawyers are not new.
Shakespeare put these words in the mouth of Dick the
Butcher in Henry VI, part 2, act 4, scene 2: “The first
thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” As Daniel Kornstein
explains in his book, Kill All the Lawyers? Shakespeare’s
Legal Appeal (1994), Shakespeare knew quite a bit about
the law. This may be because he sought to appeal to the
law students from the Inns of Court in London who
attended plays, a third of which had at least one trial
scene. Or it might be because Shakespeare had personal
experience with a none-too-happy dispute over his inheri-
tance. Whatever the reason, it appears that Shakespeare
knew much about lawyers.
Shakespeare raised the most fundamental issues of last-
ing importance in his works—war and peace, justice and
injustice, freedom and slavery, love and hate. He generally
left it to the reader to resolve the issues. Many use the
quote from Henry VI to claim that Shakespeare was anti-
lawyer. But, this is not my reading. I believe that he knew
from experience the essential role that lawyers play in pro-
tecting liberty.
One law journal that views the play as I do concisely
summarized it as follows:
This play was set in England in the mid-15th centu-
ry. Young Henry VI was thought to be a weakling,
and England was involved in an unsuccessful war
with France and was going through some economic
depression. Now, in this background, the Duke of
York attempted to incite a rebellion in the laboring
class in order to fulfill his own ambitions for obtain-
ing the throne. He did not want to call attention to
himself, so he did the planning and orchestration of
this rebellion through Jack Cade, who was a war-
monger and headstrong Kentishman. Jack Cade ulti-
mately led his riotous followers through the streets
of London, damaging and wrecking property, killing
noblemen, and attempting to establish the duke as
the rightful heir to the throne. Before the plan was
executed, Cade and his followers, among whom was
Dick the Butcher, met to discuss the plan of attack
and how they should go about gaining the political
control of England. It is during this meeting that the
sentence involving “kill all the lawyers” occurs. The
exact sentence in the play was, “The first thing we
do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” We see, then, that this
sentence was uttered by a riotous anarchist whose
intent was to overthrow the lawful government of
England. Shakespeare knew that lawyers were the
primary guardians of individual liberty in democrat-
ic England. Shakespeare also knew that an anarchi-
cal uprising from within was doomed to fail unless
the country’s lawyers were killed.
(J. B. Hopkins, The First Thing We Do, Let’s Get
Shakespeare Right! 72 FLA. B.J. 9 (1998).)
Just as Shakespeare captured the importance of lawyers
preserving liberty, Robert Bolt captured the importance of
the rule of law in A Man for All Seasons, act 1, scene 7,
when Sir Thomas More, Chancellor of England, speaks:
And when the last law was down, and the Devil
turned round on you—where would you hide, Roper,
the laws all being flat? This country’s planted thick
with laws from coast to coast—man’s laws, not
God’s—and if you cut them down—and you’re just
the man to do it—d’you really think you could stand
upright in the winds that would blow then?
With this great literature and memorable phrases in
mind, let us talk about the attacks, both implicit and
explicit, on lawyers in the United States. Perhaps the most
glaring and highly publicized example is the comment by
Charles “Cully” Stimson, deputy assistant secretary of
defense for detainee affairs, who called it “shocking” that
major U.S. law firms represented Guantanamo Bay
detainees free of charge. Stimson predicted that these
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firms would likely suffer financially after their corporate
clients learned of their pro bono work. Stimson resigned
after his remarks ignited a firestorm of controversy and
galvanized lawyers and legal organizations throughout the
United States to protest what was perceived, accurately I
believe, as an attack on the legal representation of individ-
uals who face indefinite detention.
Stimson’s remarks were not the only shot taken at
lawyers volunteering to represent Guantanamo detainees.
After he resigned, the Washington Post followed up on a
New York Times story and on April 29, 2007, wrote an edi-
torial that Shakespeare inspired. It was entitled “Ban All
the Lawyers: Prisoners at Guantanamo don’t really need
them, or so says the Justice Department.” The Post stated
that “the Justice Department has asked the federal appeals
court charged with handling all appeals of the detentions
to limit lawyers to three visits with their clients; allow
their correspondence with prisoners to be opened and
read; and give government officials the power to deny the
lawyers access to evidence.” The Post opined that “[t]he
military authorities at Guantanamo have developed a deep
antagonism, tinged with paranoia, toward the lawyers—an
attitude exemplified by the comments of former detention
chief Cully Stimson, who suggested that the law firms
sponsoring the pro bono work should be punished by their
corporate clients.” The military withdrew the request to
limit lawyer-client meetings, but still seeks to restrict the
representation at Guantanamo.
This hostility toward lawyers is not confined to those
seeking to represent Guantanamo detainees. It was appar-
ent in the way the United States litigated its case against
Yassir Hamdi, the American citizen detained in a Navy
brig in South Carolina as an enemy combatant. The gov-
ernment claimed the right to hold him for the duration of
the war on terror, which might be endless. As striking as
that single claim is, the government’s initial litigation
position was that the decision to hold him was virtually
unreviewable by a court and that he had no right to see a
lawyer—ever. The government argued to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals that “it is well-settled that the
military has the authority to capture and detain individuals
whom it has determined are enemy combatants in connec-
tion with hostilities in which the Nation is engaged,
including enemy combatants claiming American citizen-
ship. Such combatants, moreover, have no right of access
to counsel to challenge their detention.”
In opposing Supreme Court review, the solicitor gener-
al wrote that “[t]here is no obligation under the laws and
customs of war for the military to charge captured com-
batants with any offense and, indeed, the vast majority of
combatants seized during war are detained as a simple war
measure without charges. Similarly, there is no general
right to counsel under the laws and customs of war for
those who are detained as enemy combatants.”
Hamdi was captured on the battlefield, which made his
case less sympathetic than that of Jose Padilla who was
captured at O’Hare airport when he returned from abroad
to the United States. But, the government’s position was
the same. It could detain him indefinitely and deny him
access to counsel. Of course, the same position applies to
you, to me, and to all.
Ultimately, of course, the United States Supreme Court
held that citizens detained as enemy combatants are enti-
tled to some due process and have a right to consult coun-
sel in order to challenge their detentions. But, those
detained at Guantanamo who are not citizens have no
right to counsel unless they are actually prosecuted. They
get a yearly hearing into their status before a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal, but they are not entitled to coun-
sel at the hearing. Because of the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, there
can be review of the tribunal’s decision to hold an individ-
ual as an enemy combatant in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. But that review will
be of a decision rendered without the detainee having a
chance to see all evidence considered by the tribunal or to
benefit from the guiding hand of counsel.
The government has strained to keep lawyers away
from Guantanamo as much as possible because it knows
that their presence means challenges to unfair proceed-
ings, to secret evidence, and to prolonged detentions.
Lawyers have volunteered to represent the detainees, but
their ability to do so is greatly restricted by the congres-
sional elimination of both habeas corpus and the right of
detainees to bring actions challenging their detentions or
the conditions of their detentions.
No one above rule of law
I have always thought that the rule of law meant that no
one was above it and no one was below it. President
Nixon had to turn over tape recordings to a grand jury.
President Clinton was sanctioned for being untruthful in
legal proceedings and compelled to respond to a civil law-
suit while in office. They were not above the law. But, the
detainees in Guantanamo are below any standard of due
process and basic justice expected from the United States.
They get what the government chooses to give them, and
that is possible detention for life based on hearings in
which they have no lawyer.
Those who are prosecuted do get a lawyer, but they are
prosecuted under special rules that do not follow either
the procedures of a federal civilian trial or a court-martial.
When the Supreme Court invalidated military commis-
sions as violating the Code of Military Justice and the
1949 Geneva Conventions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, it
noted among other things that Common Article III of the
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Conventions prohibits “the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples.”
I am no expert on the Conventions, but this part of
Common Article III seems to me intended to assure that
those prosecuted by a signatory are tried in regular courts,
not courts that are specially constituted, and according to
regular procedures, not specially designed to make it easi-
er to convict. Compliance with Common Article III would
require prosecution in a federal civilian court or a court-
martial, or a military commission applying court-martial
rules insofar as practicable as provided in the Code of
Military Justice. But, the Military Commissions Act per-
mits prosecutions using procedures that are not standard,
and that only apply in Guantanamo. These prosecutions
are in specially constituted, not regular, courts, and use
specially constituted, not regular, procedures.
Congress can by statute abrogate all or part of a treaty,
but when it chooses to override provisions settled since
1949 it must realize that other countries may reciprocate.
Other countries may seize Americans, detain them as
enemy combatants, deny them lawyers, and prosecute
them in special courts with special rules. This does not
promote the rule of law in America or in the world. It
undermines it.
Lawyers understand this. The military and civilian
lawyers who have represented the detainees have been
remarkable. They invalidated the military commissions, at
least temporarily, in the Hamdan case. They established a
right of the detainees to file habeas corpus petitions, at
least temporarily, in Rasul v. Bush. They fought for the
right of detainees to represent themselves and succeeded
in enshrining that right in the Military Commissions Act.
In short, these lawyers fought for the rights of the
“worst of the worst,” as some administration officials
described the detainees. They demonstrated fidelity to the
rule of law, the Constitution of the United States, and fun-
damental principles of international law. Their success
undoubtedly contributes to the government’s desire to
limit what they can do in the future—i.e., to assure that
they cannot bring habeas actions or other suits on behalf
of detainees.
I regret deeply what has happened in Guantanamo.
After all, governments need fear lawyers and judges only
when they fear the truth. This is true here and it is true
throughout the world.
Consider the case of Karina Moskalenko, the Russian
lawyer who has represented chess champion Garry
Kasparov and imprisoned tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
among others. According to the Washington Post’s June 3
story about her (Finn, Russia’s Champion of Hopeless
Cases Is Targeted for Disbarment, WASH. POST, June 3,
2007, at A16), “Moskalenko, 53, is known as a formidable
legal foe of the Russian state, invariably losing in the
country’s courts but winning numerous cases at the
European Court in Strasbourg, where her clients include
the families of tortured, disappeared or murdered
Chechens.” The Post reports that the Russian Prosecutor’s
General’s Office is seeking to have her disbarred. Why?
Supposedly because she did not adequately represent
Khodorkovsky. Will anyone believe that Russia is con-
cerned that the tycoon it has imprisoned and continues to
investigate is not being adequately represented? It is hard-
ly likely given the fact that, according to the Post story,
“Khodorkovsky’s attorneys have long been subject to offi-
cial harassment, including arrests, searches of their per-
sons and offices, and seizure of defense materials.”
The Russian explanation of the move to disbar a lead-
ing human rights lawyer is as unpersuasive as our
Department of Defense attempt to explain its efforts to
limit lawyer-client visitations as protecting lawyers from
wasting their time.
While Russia seeks to disbar Moskalenko, the president
of Pakistan persists in removing the chief justice of the
Pakistan Supreme Court. The response of the public might
well have taken President Musharraf by surprise. Crowds
have protested. Lawyers have spoken out and have been
publicly beaten by police seeking to silence them. Press
accounts indicate that President Musharraf attempted to
pressure the chief justice to resign for alleged abuses of
office and invited cameramen to a meeting where he
expected the resignation to occur. Apparently the chief
justice was expected to rule on cases that might make it
more difficult for Musharraf to be elected for another
five-year term by a lame-duck parliament (which occurred
after this speech was given). The chief justice, Iftikhar
Mohammed Chaudry, refused to resign. His standing up to
the president apparently inspired not only the lawyers in
Pakistan but a large portion of the general public as well
to demand his reinstatement and beyond that to call for
genuine elections.
The efforts of the lawyers, military and civilian, to pro-
tect the rights of Guantanamo detainees, the courageous
efforts of Karina Moskalenko to make legal rights mean-
ingful in Russia, the refusal of Chief Justice Chaudry to
compromise the independence of his Supreme Court, and
the willingness of lawyers to take to the streets to support
him are all part of a fight to preserve and protect the rule
of law. It is a fight that inspires us and makes us proud to
be part of their profession. These lawyers and judges
remind us that preserving the rule of law is something
never to be taken for granted. It often is a challenge
requiring self-sacrifice and risk-taking.
If there is any good that comes from the efforts of gov-
Published in Criminal Justice, Volume 22, Number 4, Winter 2008. © 2008 American Bar Association.
Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or
by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
ernments to deny detainees lawyers, it is a reminder of the
importance of an independent bar. It is striking how little
one finds in American judicial opinions about this subject.
If we look to the north, however, we find a strong judicial
recognition of the role of an independent bar. The
Supreme Court of Canada wrote eloquently in Canada
(Attorney General) v. Law Society of British Columbia,
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 at 335-36:
The independence of the Bar from the state in all
of its pervasive manifestations is one of the hall-
marks of a free society. Consequently, regulation of
these members of the law profession by the state
must, so far as by human ingenuity it can be so
designed, be free from state interference, in the
political sense, with the delivery of services to the
individual citizens in the state, particularly in fields
of public and criminal law. The public interest in a
free society knows no area more sensitive than the
independence, impartiality and availability to the
general public of the members of the Bar and
through those members, legal advice and services
generally.
In another Canadian case, Andrews v. Law Society of
British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at pp. 187-88:
Justice McIntyre wrote:
I would observe that in the absence of an independent
legal profession, skilled and qualified to play its part in
the administration of justice and the judicial process,
the whole legal system would be in a parlous state. In
the performance of what may be called his or her pri-
vate function, that is, in advising on legal matters and
in representing clients before the courts and other tri-
bunals, the lawyer is accorded great powers not permit-
ted to other professionals. . . . . By any standard, these
powers and duties are vital to the maintenance of order
in our society and the due administration of the law in
the interest of the whole community.
I believe this implicitly. It is why I am pleased to stand
before you as a newly minted member of the International
Bar Association ready to work shoulder to shoulder with
you to preserve and protect the rule of law and to seek to
extend its reach to embrace every person wherever he or
she may be found. !
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